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Spreading the Wealth:
Is Asset Forfeiture the Key to
Enticing Local Agencies to
Enforce Federal Drug Laws?
by DAVID T. GIBSoN*
Introduction
The federal government devotes a significant amount of its
money and resources towards fighting what Richard Nixon termed
"the war on drugs."' One of the most effective legal tools used to
further this purpose is asset forfeiture, or the process by which the
government seizes and gains title to property obtained through
criminal activity or used to further a criminal conspiracy. Criminal
asset forfeiture2 can be used against drug producers and traffickers to
cripple their operations and claim their profits. This weapon can also
be wielded in civil proceedings.' For instance, in states implementing
medical cannabis programs, personal property gained from or used
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law; Bachelor of Arts, Psychology, 2009, University of Southern California. I owe a great
deal of thanks to Professor Lois Schwartz for her helpful feedback, patient supervision,
and general optimism throughout the writing of this note. I would also like to thank my
family and friends for their unending support, especially my father, who has debated with
me about the Constitution and helped me edit my writing on more late nights than either
of us can remember.
1. Timeline: America's War on Drugs, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 2, 2007),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=9252490.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 982 (2010); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2010). These statutes set out both specific
federal crimes and generalized types of offenses which may subject the offender to asset
forfeiture. The statutes also provide, by cross-reference, procedures for conducting the
post-conviction seizures.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2010); 21 U.S.C. § 881. The forfeiture provisions laid out in § 981
largely resemble those found in § 982 but do not require an antecedent criminal
conviction. These provisions also incorporate by reference United States Customs
procedures from 19 U.S.C. § 1602, and therefore modify the basis on which the respondent
is subject to search and seizure of property.
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for the sale of cannabis is subject to seizure due to the supremacy of
federal laws prohibiting narcotics sales.'
This note will address the ways in which asset forfeiture is and
can be used to further federal drug policy goals while reducing the
ever-increasing budget demands of those federal agencies responsible
for enforcement. As written, the statutes can be used as a carrot or a
stick to foster local enforcement of federal laws. Cities and counties
can be fiscally rewarded or punished for their local enforcement
regimes, especially in the case of cannabis. Cities such as Oakland,
California, obtain hundreds of thousands of dollars per year from
taxable medical cannabis sales.' The state of California recently
proposed legalizing cannabis for recreational use to generate a
projected $1.4 billion in tax revenue. Whether these same asset
forfeiture provisions apply to state and local governments that profit
from the sale of medical cannabis has yet to be determined by the
courts. Issues of sovereign immunity, federalism, and due process are
heavily implicated. Although the use of asset forfeiture to incentivize
state and local government action has been established as legally
permissible, it has not yet been attempted on an organized large scale.
I. Federal Drug Policy: The Problem of Enforcement
Eradicating drugs in the United States has been a notoriously
difficult task. Narcotics use has increased in all categories (with the
exception of opium) since the advent of prohibition.! National
surveys show that recreational drug use has become more socially
4. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden on behalf of
Attorney General Eric Holder and the U.S. Dep't of Justice for Selected U.S. Attorneys
on Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana
(October 19, 2009), http:/fblogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/192. Attorney General Eric
Holder released a memorandum on October 19, 2009, clarifying the federal government's
position on state medical cannabis programs. He acknowledged that these programs
violate federal law, but stated that United States Attorneys are vested with "plenary
authority with regard to federal criminal matters" and that patients and caregivers who are
in "clear and unambiguous" compliance with state law should be a low priority. Because
this is a discretionary policy choice, it is non-binding and may be reversed at any time.
5. Zusha Elinson, City: Medical Pot Sales in Oakland Reach $35 Million This Year,
THE BAY CITIZEN (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.baycitizen.org/marijuana/story/city-
medical-pot-sales-oakland-reach/.
6. Assembly Member Ammiano, Staff Legislative Bill Analysis for Assembly Bill
390, STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION 1, 6 (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.boe.ca.gov/legdiv/
pdflab0390-1dw.pdf.
7. Interview with Dr. Robert DuPont, FRONTLINE (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/interviews/dupont.html.
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acceptable than in previous decades.' This increased demand has led
suppliers to provide ever greater quantities of their black market
products to eager consumers.
The Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), under the
Department of Justice, is the lead agency responsible for combating
drug smuggling and drug use domestically and beyond national
borders.'o Each year the amount of drugs seized and the number of
persons incarcerated increases." The budget of the DEA has grown
drastically as well. At the time of its creation in 1973, the DEA had a
budget of just under $75 million. 2 Its allocation for 2010 was more
than $2.6 billion, over thirty-two times greater than its initial budget."
However, despite this rapid growth, the DEA's resources still seem
limited given that its jurisdiction spans the United States and at times
crosses its borders. The agency employs over 10,700 people," about
half of whom are special agents." This means there is roughly one
special agent for every 58,000 Americans. When one considers that
25.8 million Americans are estimated by the DEA to have used illicit
8. See, e.g., John Burnett, What if Marijuana Were Legal? Possible Outcomes,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 20, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=103276152; Jessica Macias, Marijuana Considered as "Socially
Accepted" as Alcohol, but Can Still Pose Risks, THE MIAMI HURRICANE (Mar. 29, 2009),
http://www.themiamihurricane.com/2009/03/29/marijuana-considered-as-socially-accepted-
as-alcohol-but-can-still-pose-risks/; Shock at drug and alcohol abuse by under-12s, BBC
NEWS (Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-10902558.
9. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE NAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., NAT'L DRUG
THREAT ASSESSMENT 2010 1, 3 (2010). Data in this report suggests that 14.2% of
Americans twelve years of age and older have used an illicit drug in the last year. In the
case of cannabis, the most commonly used illicit drug, 25.8 million individuals report usage
in the last year. The DEA also estimated that 2.9 million individuals tried an illicit
substance for the first time in 2008.
10. DEA Mission Statement, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.,
http://www.justice.gov/dea/agency/mission.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
11. See HEATHER C. WEST, WILLIAM J. SABOL & SARAH J. GREENMAN, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009 (2010), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf. Between 2000 and 2008 the number of
drug offenders incarcerated in federal prisons has increased by an average of 3.1% per
year. Stated differently, this means the number of persons in federal prison for drug
offenses increased almost 30% over an eight-year period.
12. DEA History, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/
deafhistory.htm (last visited Jan.22,2011).
13. Id.
14. DEA Staffing & Budget, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.justice.
gov/dealagency/staffing.htm (last visited Jan. 22,2011).
15. Id. In 2009 there were 5,233 special agents. The other 5,551 paid employees
comprise support staff and do not directly participate in law enforcement.
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substances in the previous year, 6 it follows that (at least occasional)
drug users outnumber special agents by a ratio of 5,446 to one." It is
no surprise, then, that controlling drug use remains a challenge.
Adding to the DEA's difficulties is the fact that it is unable to
compel state and local police to enforce federal law. This stems from
the anti-commandeering principle, as discussed in the landmark case
of New York v. United States.'8 In that case, the state of New York
challenged certain provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act." The Act's purpose was to encourage the
states to deal with radioactive waste by providing monetary incentives
for meeting certain disposal requirements.20 The Act also provided
that if states did not comply, they would take legal title to, and
liability for, the radioactive waste generated within their borders.2'
In a 6-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the
"take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act unconstitutionally commandeered state legislatures
for the furtherance of federal purposes.22 This provision was a
violation of the Tenth Amendment's reservation of power to the
states,23 and went against the long-held principle of federalism as
written into the structure of the Constitution.2 4 Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, held that "[n]o matter how powerful the
federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not give
Congress the authority to require the States to regulate."2 5
The Court went on to distinguish the permissible practice of
incentivizing compliance with federal law from the impermissible
practice of applying sanctions for noncompliance. Although
Congress may use its spending power to influence the behavior of the
states,26 it violates the Constitution when it imposes its will via
16. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE NAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., NAT'L DRUG
THREAT ASSESSMENT 20101,3 (2010).
17. DEA Staffing & Budget, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.,
http://www.justice.gov/dealagency/staffing.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (giving precise
number of special agents as 5,233).
18. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
19. Id. at 149.
20. Id. at 152-53.
21. Id. at 153-54.
22. Id. at 175-76.
23. Id. at 177-178.
24. Id. at 183.
25. Id. at 178.
26. Id. at 167.
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penalties.7 The "take title" provision was evaluated on the basis of
the two options presented to state governments. Both were deemed
to be beyond the scope of Congress' power:
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to
waste, standing alone, would be beyond the authority of
Congress, and because a direct order to regulate, standing
alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it
follows that Congress lacks the power to offer the States a
choice between the two. Unlike the first two sets of incentives
[provided for in the Act], the take title incentive does not
represent the conditional exercise of any congressional power
enumerated in the Constitution. . . . Either way, "the Act
commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program," an outcome that has never been understood to lie
within the authority conferred upon Congress by the
Constitution.28
Justice O'Connor declared that, "[w]here a federal interest is
sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so
directly; it may not conscript state governments as its agents."29
This precedent effectively prevents the federal government from
forcing state and local police to act, as no penalty can attach when the
mandate is ignored. In the case of localized drug enforcement,
Congress instead must either legislate directly (as it did by creating
the DEA), or else find some way of enticing the states to enforce drug
laws voluntarily.
II. Asset Forfeiture: Killing Two Birds with One Stone
An advantage of asset forfeiture-that is, seizing the property
used in a crime-is that it deprives the criminal of his tools while
simultaneously providing additional means of law enforcement to the
government. For example, a ship confiscated from a convicted pirate
could be repurposed as a navy vessel for the hunting of pirates. Asset
forfeiture has a long history in the United States, originating in
English common law.30 Early statutes typically allowed for the seizure
27. Id. at 175-76.
28. Id. at 176 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981)).
29. New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
30. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1974); see
also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611-13 (1993). These cases trace asset
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of ships used for customs offenses,31 and later for piracy32 and slave
trafficking.33
The government began to style suits in rem when property was to
be taken. These suits were based on the legal theory that the
property itself was the offender, and the criminal was but a third
party claimant.' Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story summarized
the principle distinguishing in rem actions from in personam actions in
an early pirate-vessel forfeiture case: "The thing is here primarily
considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily
to the thing . . . ."" Unless the property's owner chooses to file a
claim contesting the forfeiture, he or she need not be a party to the
action at all.
In rem suits based on this legal theory markedly increased the
power of the government because property could be seized before a
conviction was obtained, or even in some cases before the owner was
identified.36  The government could take a slave ship floating in
territorial waters, notwithstanding the fact that its crew had either
fled the jurisdiction of the United States" or abandoned the vessel
entirely before law enforcement discovered it."
forfeiture laws to early statutes and common law enforced in the English colonies in
America before ratification of the United States Constitution. They also trace the concept
of forfeiture to pre-Judeo-Christian practices.
31. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 119 (1993) ("The First
Congress enacted legislation authorizing the seizure and forfeiture of ships and cargos
involved in customs offenses.").
32. See id. ("Other statutes authorized the seizure of ships engaged in piracy."); see
also The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 8 (1827) ("[W]henever any vessel or boat from which any
piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure, shall have been first
attempted or made, shall be captured and brought into any port of the United States, the
same shall and may be adjudged and condemned to their use, and that of the captors, after
due process and trial, in any Court having admiralty jurisdiction, and which shall be
holden for the district into which such captured vessel shall be brought, and the same
Court shall thereupon order a sale and distribution thereof accordingly, and at their
discretion.").
33. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683. First made subject to forfeiture were those
vessels used to transport slaves out of the country, and later those used to deliver slaves to
the United States.
34. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14.
35. Id.
36. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615 n.9 ("The fictions of in rem
forfeiture were developed primarily to expand the reach of the courts, which, particularly
in admiralty proceedings, might have lacked in personam jurisdiction over the owner of
the property.") (citations omitted).
37. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 472 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (The
prevalence of in rem suits stemmed from "the necessity of finding some source of
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The twentieth century marked a further expansion of
government power. With the advent of bootlegging, the government
used asset forfeiture to seize the land used to distill alcohol and the
automobiles used to transport it. 9 The Supreme Court upheld the
notion that property used in criminal offenses could be seized
regardless of the owner's role in the crime. Cases such as J.W.
Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States" and Van Oster v. Kansas4 1
upheld the forfeiture of vehicles used by persons other than their
owners to transport alcohol. Twentieth century jurisprudence began
to depart from the theory of property as an offender. A new theory
emerged that property was subject to forfeiture when used as an
"instrumentality" of a crime.42 Under this theory, the innocence of an
owner was irrelevant, as he or she was deemed justly punished for
negligently allowing the property to be used in a crime.43 In this way,
the Court managed to sidestep Fifth Amendment due process issues.
By the mid-1900s, Congress had codified forfeiture statutes for a
wider variety of offenses, including offenses such as gambling."
The most recent and groundbreaking changes in asset forfeiture
came in 1978 and 1984, when Congress amended the drug forfeiture
statutes. In two critically important moves calculated to aid the war
on drugs, Congress first allowed for the forfeiture of the proceeds of
the offense,45 then of the property used to facilitate it.46  Congress
compensation for injuries done by a vessel whose responsible owners were often half a
world away and beyond the practical reach of the law and its processes.").
38. Id. at 447 (The owner of the vessel need be found before commencing a forfeiture
action, as "the acts of the master and crew ... bind the interest of the owner of the ship,
whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces
as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs.")
(citations omitted).
39. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 60 (1993)
(Preventing bootlegging and tax evasion was a high priority for the government, as by
1902 "nearly 75 percent of total federal revenues-$479 million out of a total of $653
million-was raised from taxes on liquor, customs, and tobacco.").
40. See J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
41. See Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
42. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 333 n.8 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) ("Although the term 'instrumentality' is of recent
vintage, see Austin v. United States, it fairly characterizes property that historically was
subject to forfeiture because it was the actual means by which an offense was
committed.") (internal citations omitted).
43. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 615 (explanation of dual purpose of asset forfeiture).
44. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) (forfeiture
utilized for gambling offense).
45. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1978) (concerning forfeiture of drug offense proceeds).
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broadened the definition of "facilitate" in 1990 to include property
with a substantial connection to the crime," and anything that makes
the offense easier to commit or harder to detect.48 The types of
property subject to seizure grew immeasurably larger. Not only could
the government now seize a kilogram of cocaine and the car used to
transport it, but also the house in which it was stored and packaged,
the buildings used to count and launder the money, and almost
anything purchased with the profits.
III. Providing Local Enforcement Incentives
Property forfeited to the government can be retained for a
number of uses, or turned over to local authorities if they assisted the
DEA in seizing the subject property. The attorney general is
empowered to "transfer the property to any Federal agency or to any
State or local law enforcement agency which participated directly in
the seizure or forfeiture of the property . . . ."49 The amount to be
transferred depends directly on the level of involvement of the state
or local agency. The value of the property must bear "a reasonable
relationship to the degree of direct participation of the State or local
agency in the law enforcement effort resulting in the forfeiture, taking
into account the total value of all property forfeited and the total law
enforcement effort . . . .".o Taken to the extreme, this would mean
that a local agency enforcing federal drug law could be transferred
the full value of the property forfeited. This fact gives rise to a
number of interesting and fortuitous implications for the federal
government.
First, and perhaps most obviously, these incentives overcome the
anti-commandeering principle discussed in New York v. United
States. In New York, the Supreme Court held that, while the
punitive elements of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
were unconstitutional, the provisions providing incentives for
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1984) (concerning forfeiture of real property used to
commit or to facilitate the commission of a felony drug offense).
47. See United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1990) (The court had
previously used a "substantial connection" test, whereby the property at issue "either must
be used or intended to be used to commit a crime, or must facilitate the commission of a
crime. At minimum, the property must have more than an incidental or fortuitous
connection to criminal activity.").
48. Id.
49. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (2010).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3)(A) (2010).
51. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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compliance posed no such problems.5 2 Accordingly, state and local
law enforcement agencies can garner huge prizes by making drug
busts within their jurisdictions. Once the instrumentalities and
proceeds of drug trafficking are uncovered by, for example, the
Sheriff's Department in Los Angeles County, it can notify the closest
DEA field office to commence a federal asset forfeiture proceeding.
The United States attorney general may then reward this initiative on
the part of the Sheriff's Department by transferring all of the seized
property to it.
This situation is win-win from both the federal and local
perspectives. The federal government is able to use local actors to
further federal policies in a way that neither violates the Constitution
nor incurs additional budget expenses. The asset forfeitures are self-
sustaining in that criminals-not taxpayers-finance the rewards to
local agencies. The transfer of confiscated property can be
conditioned on the successful prosecution of the drug traffickers, thus
assuring quality police work and reducing the potential for abuse.
The DEA's resources and reach would be drastically increased in an
extremely cost-effective manner.
In the hypothetical scenario described above, the Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department could repurpose the forfeited property,
or sell the property to purchase new equipment and hire more
personnel. In many cases, the value of seized property may be vastly
higher than the costs incurred by law enforcement in obtaining it,
creating powerful incentives for the Sheriff to enforce federal drug
law. For example, the median home value in Los Angeles County is
$360,000." Only a fraction of that amount would be spent
investigating and effectuating the arrest of a drug distributor who
kept drugs in his or her home. Additional funding from the federal
government could be an attractive prospect given California's current
budget deficits.54
52. Id. at 173-74 (conditioning grants on attainment of milestones is permissible;
conditional exercise of Congress' commerce power is acceptable).
53. Southern California Home Sale Activity: L.A. Times Sunday Edition Charts - Data
for the Year 2010 - corrected, DATAQUICK INFORMATION SYSTEMS, http://www.dqnews.
com/Charts/Annual-Charts/LA-Times-Charts/ZIPLAT1O.aspx (last visited Feb. 8,2011).
54. As of the writing of this note in 2011, California faces some of the largest
budgetary crunches in its history. Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. in his proposed
budget for 2011-2012 notes that "[w]e begin 2011, after the longest budget stalemate in the
history of California, with a budget gap of more than $25 billion." EDMUND G. BROWN,
JR., GOVERNOR, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 2011-12 GOVERNOR'S BUDGET SUMMARY iii
(2011), available at http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdflBudgetSummary/FullBudget
Summary.pdf. He reiterates, "This is a tough budget for tough times." Id.
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The ability of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to
precipitate forfeiture proceedings through the DEA would also
increase its ability to abate local nuisances. Local agencies find this
attractive because it decreases repetitive enforcement actions and
frees up officers and resources. For example, so-called "crack
houses" that are continuously revisited by police could be closed
down permanently and put to better use." Seizing firearms from drug
dealers removes weapons from the street and prevents their use
against civilians or officers at a later date." Increased nuisance
abatement power could be instrumental to the prevention of future
crimes.
The second implication of this system would be a shift towards
community standards of drug policy enforcement. The DEA, due to
its limited size, can only pursue a relatively small number of drug
smugglers and traffickers with its own resources. Targets of the DEA
tend to be the "big fish" of the narcotics market, regardless of where
in the United States they are operating. As a result, federal busts in
areas of California like San Francisco and Santa Cruz have been met
with great hostility," whereas other localities with smaller drug trades
have actively but unsuccessfully petitioned the DEA for assistance."
Transferring the enforcement, as opposed to prosecutorial, duties to
local police departments allows communities to determine for
themselves what amount of drug use to tolerate. Counties supportive
55. United States v. 141 St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990) (building used to sell
crack cocaine subject to forfeiture).
56. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984)
(firearms used illegally or intended for illegal use subject to forfeiture).
57. See DEA Mission Statement, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.,
http://www.justice.gov/dealagency/mission.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (The DEA's
mission statement declares that one of the agency's primary responsibilities is "the
prosecution of major violators of controlled substance laws operating at interstate and
international levels.").
58. See, e.g., Maria Alicia Gaura, Santa Cruz Officials Fume over Medical Pot Club
Bust: DEA Arrests Founders, Confiscates Plants, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Sep. 6,
2002), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2002/09/06/MN212302.DTL; Los
Angeles City Council Votes to End Federal DEA Medical Marijuana Raids, AMERICANS
FOR SAFE ACCESS (Jul. 25, 2007), http://www.safeaccessnow.org/article.php?id=4877.
59. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT DIVISION,
AUDIT OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION'S MOBILE ENFORCEMENT
TEAM PROGRAM (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/DEAla1108.pdf.
The DEA established a "Mobile Enforcement Team" program in 1995 to help local law
enforcement agencies confront drug trafficking problems that were beyond their
operational capabilities. The program was cancelled in 1997 due to budget cuts, but since
2008 has reemerged on a limited basis.
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of state medical cannabis programs can allow these programs to
operate with a decreased risk of federal intervention, whereas
counties disfavoring such programs can shut down operations while
gaining additional police resources and funding. Local citizens are
empowered by their votes for police chief and sheriff to exert control
over what happens in their metaphorical backyards.
In this way, community standards will begin to govern drug
enforcement policies in much the same way community standards
govern obscenity. The three-pronged Miller test used by the federal
courts in obscenity trials contains a requirement that "'the average
person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest."6 Chief
Justice Burger emphasized in Miller's majority opinion that the
community standard prong allowed enforcement of the law with some
amount of local flavor, so that a contentious law like the regulation of
obscenity could meet the standards of the people subject to it. Justice
Burger writes, "The adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual
ultimate factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has historically
permitted triers of fact to draw on the standards of their community,
guided always by limiting instructions on the law."6  Allowing for the
same type of guided local control of drug enforcement policies would
likely do much to help a community more fully accept a contentious
national law.
IV. Requiring Local Compliance with Drug Laws
In addition to providing incentives to cities that enforce federal
law, asset forfeiture provisions allow for the punishment of cities that
violate it. Sixteen states so far have legalized cannabis for medical
use62 despite its federal classification as a Schedule I drug with no
recognized medical value." Medical cannabis sales have become big
60. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
61. Id. at 30.
62. See Active State Medical Marijuana Programs, THE NAT'L ORG. FOR THE
REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS, http://norml.org/index.cfm?Group-ID=3391 (last
accessed Mar. 2, 2011). States that have legalized cannabis for medical use include:
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. As
of July 2010, the District of Columbia also has a medical cannabis program despite the fact
that it exists on federal land.
63. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2010) (listing criteria for placement in schedule 1); 21
U.S.C. § 812(c) (listing cannabis, under the antiquated term "marihuana," and its active
ingredient tetrahydrocannabinol as schedule I substances).
579
580 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 39:2
business in several of these states. California, in particular, has
embraced the medical cannabis model with liberal laws that do not
permit the courts to second-guess a doctor's recommendation of
cannabis for a patient." Medical cannabis dispensaries are
established in a number of California cities and counties, increasing
patients' access to the drug.5 These dispensaries are subject to state
sales tax like regular businesses, despite the fact that they operate in
violation of federal law.' Cities like Oakland, California, collect
hundreds of thousands of dollars per year in additional municipal
sales taxes on medical cannabis.6 ' The wording of some asset
forfeiture statutes, however, leaves open the possibility that all of
these municipal sales taxes are subject to confiscation by the federal
government.
The forfeiture statute codified at 21 U.S.C § 881 begins as
follows: "The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United
States and no property right shall exist in them . . . ."6 Sixth on the
list of items subject to forfeiture is:
All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things
of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in
exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical in
violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an
exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and
securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation
69
of this subchapter.
64. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(c) (2010) ("Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no physician in this state shall be punished, or denied any right or
privilege, for having recommended marijuana to a patient for medical purposes.")
65. California allows medical cannabis dispensaries to operate in the form of patient's
collectives or cooperatives. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.775 (West 2011).
This effectuates the third goal of the statutory Medical Marijuana Program Act, which is
to "[e]nhance the access of patients and caregivers to medical marijuana through
collective, cooperative cultivation projects." 2003 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 875, at *1
(Deering).
66. CA. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, SPECIAL NOTICE: IMPORTANT
INFORMATION FOR SELLERS OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA 1 (2007), available at
http://www.boe.ca.gov/news/pdf/medseller2007.pdf.
67. Zusha Elinson, City: Medical Pot Sales in Oakland Reach $35 Million This Year,
THE BAY CITIZEN (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.baycitizen.org/marijuana/story/city-
medical-pot-sales-oakland-reach/.
68. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (2010).
69. Id. at § 881(a)(6) (2010).
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This phrasing provides for an action in rem against any currency
or proceeds involved in or traceable to a drug transaction. There is
no requirement of a conviction or of any specific criminal intent prior
to seizure. The statute essentially provides that no entity, other than
the federal government of the United States, can hold title to the
proceeds of a drug transaction.
Municipal sales taxes on medical cannabis would almost certainly
be encompassed within this definition of moneys subject to forfeiture.
The sales tax here is a proceed directly traceable to an exchange of
money for cannabis. The tax money would not exist but for the
cannabis sale. Furthermore, the city is not being deprived of the
money it has collected, so no due process issue could arise. Because
the city could not hold title to those funds in the first place, it could
not argue that it is being deprived of them.
Tax dollars would not be the only property subject to forfeiture.
For example, the City of Oakland recently considered whether
growers of medical cannabis within the city limits should be required
to use space in four large warehouses licensed by the city.'o The idea
behind the ordinance was that concentrating cannabis cultivation in
one small part of the city would curb nonmedical growing operations
and allow for more control and security over a drug with high black
market value." In addition, an estimated 350 union jobs would be
created and $2 million dollars in new annual tax revenue would be
realized by the city. 2 The unintended effect of the ordinance would
be to subject Oakland's licensed warehouse property to forfeiture.
Seventh on the list of items subject to seizure is:
All real property, including any right, title, and interest
(including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or
tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is
used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit,
or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter
punishable by more than one year's imprisonment."
70. Kate McLean, Oakland Says 'Yes' to Industrial Pot, THE BAY CITIZEN (Jul. 21,
2010), http://www.baycitizen.org/marijuana/story/oakland-council-say-yes-industrial-pot/.
71. COUNCIL MEMBER REBECCA KAPLAN & COUNCIL MEMBER LARRY REID,
CITY OF OAKLAND AGENDA REPORT JULY 13, 2010, 2 (2010), available at
http://clerkwebsvrl.oaklandnet.com/attachments/25535.pdf.
72. David Downs, Study: $2 Million in Taxes, 350 Jobs From Oakland-Licensed
Cannabis Grow Facility, EAST BAY EXPRESS (May 24, 2010), http://www.eastbay
express.com/LegalizationNation/archives/2010/05/24/study-2-million-in-taxes-350-jobs-from-
oakland-licensed-cannabis-grow-facility.
73. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (2010).
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Were Oakland to move forward with its warehouse plan, a
property right would cease to exist in both the land and the structure
chosen to implement the plan. The federal government could seize
and then utilize or sell the real estate for its own purposes without
needing to demonstrate anything but the cultivation of cannabis on
the premises. Ironically, the DEA could use the warehouse as a site
for a new field office if it so desired.
It is an increasingly likely possibility that these government-
sanctioned cannabis cultivation and sales schemes will expand from
the local level to the state level. California recently voted on a
statewide ballot measure to legalize, regulate, and tax cannabis for
recreational purposes.74 The anticipated yearly revenue from
taxation, as determined by the state's legislative analyst, would be
"hundreds of millions of dollars annually."75 An early estimate by the
State Board of Equalization projected as much as $1.4 billion in new
revenues.76
While this money is also likely subject to seizure, some additional
factors could complicate the situation. The foremost consideration
militating against the confiscation of state tax dollars is the doctrine
of sovereign immunity for states. Sovereign immunity is "[t]he
principle that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts or in any
other court without its consent and permission; a principle which
applies with full force to the several states of the Union."" However,
Justice Powell stated in the case of Welch v. Texas Department of
Highways and Public Transportation78 that "[t]he contours of state
sovereign immunity are determined by the structure and
requirements of the federal system." 79 He continues, "[T]he United
States may sue a State, because that is 'inherent in the Constitutional
74. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, PROPOSITION 19, OFFICIAL VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE (2010), available at http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/
propositions/19/. The ballot initiative would have allowed people twenty-one years or
older to possess, cultivate, and transport limited amounts of cannabis for personal use.
California's medical cannabis legislation would remain active, so patients would not be
constrained by the Proposition 19 possession limits for recreational users.
75. Id.
76. Assembly Member Ammiano, Staff Legislative Bill Analysis for Assembly Bill
390, STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION (Feb 23, 2009), http://www.boe.ca.gov/legdiv/pdf/
ab0390-ldw.pdf.
77. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).
78. Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
79. Id. at 487.
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plan.' Absent such a provision, 'the permanence of the Union might
be endangered."' Additionally, the in rem nature of a civil forfeiture
could sidestep the issue of sovereign immunity because, as with the
City of Oakland, no state could hold title to the tax money in the first
place.
V. Potential for Abuse
Asset forfeiture, like most powerful tools, may be subject to
abuse by unscrupulous actors. The prospect of obtaining valuable
property and real estate creates powerful incentives for local law
enforcement agencies to enforce federal drug law. This goal-focused
approach to drug enforcement can distract police from their mission
of acting in the public's best interest.
The case of Donald Scott is one example of a situation where a
forfeiture-motivated drug enforcement action ended tragically. On
October 2, 1992, a drug enforcement task force conducted a surprise
early-morning raid of Scott's 250-acre ranch property near Malibu,
California." Their warrant was obtained based on a belief that Scott
was cultivating somewhere between fifty and several thousand
cannabis plants on his property." Officers broke down Scott's door
and subdued his wife, who shouted, "Don't shoot me! Don't kill
me!" 83 Scott was awakened by his wife's cries and came out of his
bedroom carrying a gun over his head.' Officers told Scott to put
down the weapon, and as he lowered his arm they fatally shot him."
At that point, "[d]eputies searched Scott's property for hours after
the shooting, but not a single marijuana plant was found."
After a five-month investigation, District Attorney Michael D.
Bradbury stated that the raid was unjustified.' Despite an
80. Id. (citations omitted).
81. Ron Soble, A Violent Confrontation Ends Man's Colorful Life, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1992, at 1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1992-10-12/news/mn-163_1_drug-task-
force.
82. Richard Miniter, Ill-Gotten Gains, REASON (Aug/Sept 1993), http://reason.com/
archives/1993/08/01/ill-gotten-gains. A Sheriff's Department informant claimed that
thousands of cannabis plants were growing on Scott's property. A DEA agent conducting
an aerial surveillance flyover claimed to have seen fifty plants.
83. Soble, supra note 81, at 3.
84. Id. at 4.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1.
87. Richard Miniter, Ill-Gotten Gains, REASON (Aug/Sept 1993), http://reason.com/
archives/1993/08/01/ill-gotten-gains.
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informant's claim that there were "thousands" of plants on the
property, two sets of aerial photographs showed no indication that
any cannabis was being grown." Bradbury explained that, without
binoculars, it would be impossible to positively identify fifty plants
from a plane 1,000 feet in the air, contrary to what an agent had
previously claimed. 9 Bradbury also discovered that the Sheriff's
Department had obtained its search warrant by withholding evidence
and testimony from the judge who signed it.'
Nicholas Gutsue, the Scott family's attorney, discovered that
Scott had repeatedly refused to sell his land to the National Park
Service, which wished to make it part of the Santa Monica Mountains
National Recreation Area." He suspected that a forfeiture deal
motivated the raid of Scott's property:
After the raid, the police would seize the $5-million ranch
under federal forfeiture law, which allows the government to
take property used to commit a drug crime. The Park Service
would buy the land, and the other participating agencies would
share the proceeds. Gutsue notes that Park Service rangers
took part in the raid, along with county, state, and federal drug
92
warriors.
Deputy District Attorney Kevin DeNoce came to the same
conclusion as Gutsue in a letter he wrote to District Attorney
Bradbury.93 He found that prior to the search warrant's execution,
law enforcement officers in multiple agencies including the Park
Service had discussed the possibility of seizing and forfeiting the
ranch.94 Officers at a Sheriff's briefing had received a property
88. Id.
89. Id. The Court has repeatedly banned searches of the home based only on a line
of sight beyond what the naked eye can see. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986);
see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
90. Id. ("Ventura Municipal Court Judge Herbert Curtis III was not told that a
federal reconnaissance team had found no drugs on Scott's land when they searched parts
of it on two occasions a week earlier. Furthermore, Bradbury said several of the affidavits
used to support the request for a search warrant were either false or misleading.")
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Letter from Kevin G. DeNoce, Deputy District Attorney, Office of the District
Attorney, County of Ventura, State of California, to Michael D. Bradbury, District
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appraisal statement of the ranch and a parcel map of the area.' The
DEA agent conducting flyover surveillance noted on his parcel map
that the ranch property was approximately 200 acres, and that an
eighty-acre parcel in the area had sold recently for $800,000.96
DeNoce wrote:
We can find no reason why law enforcement officers who were
investigating suspected narcotics violations would have any
interest in the value of the Trail's End Ranch or the value of
property sold in the same area other than ff [sic] they had a
motive to forfeit that property. As discussed in our report,
although there may be other explanations for this information,
it is our opinion that the most reasonable explanation is that the
law enforcement officers involved in the preparation of the
search warrant were motivated, in part, by a desire to forfeit a
valuable piece of property."
Donald Scott's death illustrates one of the major potential
drawbacks of incentivizing drug enforcement with asset forfeiture:
High-value targets may be favored over high-priority targets. This
problem is not only limited to cases of police misconduct, as with the
raid on Scott's ranch. It exists even in cases where officers act
prudently and fully comply with proper police procedures. From a
public safety perspective, forfeiting a dilapidated rural trailer where
large amounts of methamphetamine are produced should be a much
higher priority than forfeiting a gated-community mansion with
several cannabis plants growing in the garage. From the perspective
of a law enforcement agency with severe budget woes, however, the
exact opposite may be true. It is the classic conflict of interest.
VI. Attempts at Reform: The Passage of CAFRA
The largest asset forfeiture reform since Congress strengthened
the drug forfeiture statutes in 1978 and 1984 has been the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 ("CAFRA").98 The reform effort was
driven by an increasing sentiment that forfeiture procedures were too
powerful and were unfair to property owners. Judge Clarence Arlen




98. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2010). CAFRA also modifies a number of other U.S. Code
provisions to reflect the reforms included in § 983. The most affected of these are 18
U.S.C. §§ 981(g), 983, and 985 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2466 to 2467 and 2680.
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The government, under the current approach, need not produce
any admissible evidence and may deprive citizens of property
based on the rankest of hearsay and the flimsiest evidence. This
result clearly does not reflect the value of private property in
our society and makes the risk of an erroneous deprivation
intolerable.
CAFRA added several new protections for property owners.
The new procedures were an attempt to increase the due process
afforded to claimants in civil proceedings and remedy the federal
government's perceived "abuses of fundamental fairness."o
First, and perhaps most significantly, CAFRA shifted the burden
of proof to the government.o Previously, the owner of property had
the burden of proving that he or she did everything possible to
prevent the property from being used for illegal activity. In the case
of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,02 a boat leasing
company had leased a pleasure yacht to two Puerto Rican residents
who were later found in possession of cannabis plants on board.03
Puerto Rican authorities seized the boat after one of the lessees was
charged with a violation of the Controlled Substances Act.'" The
Court found that the leasing company was "in no way . . . involved in
the criminal enterprise carried on by (the) lessee" and "had no
knowledge that its property was being used in connection with or in
violation of (Puerto Rican Law)."o' The seizure was nevertheless
upheld on the basis that, "in this case appellee voluntarily entrusted
the lesses [sic] with possession of the yacht, and no allegation has
been made or proof offered that the company did all that it
reasonably could to avoid having its property put to an unlawful
use."10
CAFRA reversed this standard, such that "the burden of proof is
on the Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
99. United States v. Twelve Thousand, Three Hundred Ninety Dollars ($12, 390.00),
956 F.2d 801, 811 (8th Cir. 1992).
100. Press Release, Rep. Henry Hyde, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., Forfeiture
Reform: Now or Never? (May 3, 1999), http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/na0618_1.htm.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c) (2010).
102. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
103. Id. at 665.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 668.
106. Id. at 690.
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that the property is subject to forfeiture."'" It also provides that "if
the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to
commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was
involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government
shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the
property and the offense."'" The substantial connection must now
also be proven by a preponderance of the evidence and not merely
probable cause."*
Second, and also very importantly, CAFRA created a universal
"innocent owner" defense for forfeiture proceedings. The statute
provides, "An innocent owner's interest in property shall not be
forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute. The claimant shall have
the burden of proving that the claimant is an innocent owner by a
preponderance of the evidence."o The language reading "any civil
forfeiture statute" means that the innocent owner defense applies to
any individual statute the government may use to initiate an in rem
proceeding, whether it be for drugs, customs violations, or otherwise.
Two types of owners are protected by this defense: owners of
property at the time a crime was committed, and owners acquiring
property after a crime was committed. If the interest in property
belonged to the claimant at the time the crime was committed (such
as the owners of hotels, where rented hotel rooms were used to
broker drug deals unbeknownst to them), the claimant must show
either that there was no knowledge of the illegal conduct'" or, that
upon learning of the illegal conduct, he or she did everything that
could reasonably be expected to terminate the unlawful use."2 If the
owner acquired the property interest after the commission of a crime
(such as an unknowing purchaser of an automobile that had been
used to traffic drugs), the claimant must show that he or she was a
bona fide purchaser (or seller) for value,"' and that he or she did not
107. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2010).
108. Id. at §. § 983(c)(3).
109. United States v. Mondragon, 313 F.3d 862, 865 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[Tlhe
government's trial burden was to show probable cause for forfeiture. . . . Now, after
CAFRA's enactment, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the property is subject to forfeiture.") (citations omitted).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (2010).
111. Id. at § 983(d)(2)(A)(i).
112. Id. at § 983(d)(2)(A)(ii).
113. Id. at § 983(d)(3)(A)(i).
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know, and could not have reasonably known, that the property was
subject to forfeiture. 1 4
Finally, a number of other changes were enacted to enhance
claimants' rights by making civil asset forfeitures more closely
resemble criminal trials. Among these were enhanced notice and
timing requirements that must be met by the federal government,"
the availability of legal counsel for claimants who do not have the
financial ability to retain a private lawyer," the availability of
motions to set aside forfeitures where the owner was not properly
notified of the proceeding,"' and a proportionality requirement
intended to prevent seizures that are constitutionally excessive.1
While CAFRA was a step in the right direction for curbing abuse
of forfeiture statutes, additional protections are still needed before
forfeiture can be used as a viable means of incentivizing state and
local actors. The most obvious problem still remaining is the issue of
mitigating the inherent conflict of interest between seizing high-value
versus high-priority targets.
VII. Remaining Problems and Proposed Solutions
One point of unfairness with the current system of in rem asset
forfeiture is that property is subject to double jeopardy"' if a criminal
proceeding fails. For example, in the case of United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms,120 the government charged Patrick
Mulcahey with knowingly dealing firearms without a license after
seizing a cache of guns from his house. 12' He was subsequently
acquitted after a jury trial.122  Following Mulcahey's acquittal the
government instituted an in rern action for forfeiture of the firearms
114. Id. at § 983(d)(3)(A)(ii).
115. Id. at § 983(a).
116. Id. at § 983(b).
117. Id. at § 983(e).
118. Id. at § 983(g).
119. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution reads, "[N]or shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. While it is impossible to subject property to double jeopardy, as
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to civil proceedings, the principles of being
subjected twice to punishment for the same crime are very similar. I am referring here to
the double jeopardy principle and not the actual double jeopardy forbidden by the United
States Constitution.
120. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
121. Id. at 355-56.
122. Id. at 356.
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they had seized.1" Mulcahey raised the defenses of collateral estoppel
and res judicata on the basis of his acquittal at trial; however, his
defenses were struck down.24 The court's rationale for allowing the
forfeiture action to go forward was that asset forfeiture is a remedial
civil action, and not a criminal proceeding. Supreme Court Justice
Burger wrote, "acquittal on a criminal charge is not a bar to a civil
action by the Government, remedial in its nature, arising out of the
same facts on which the criminal proceeding was based has long been
settled."" He then went on to explain that Mulcahey's situation was
not true double jeopardy from a constitutional standpoint. He wrote,
"Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect
to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits
merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish
criminally, for the same offense."1 26
While Justice Burger carefully distinguishes the punitive criminal
action brought against Mulcahey from the remedial civil one, the
distinction is purely technical. From a practical standpoint, the
purpose of the civil action was punitive in that the government moved
to seize the guns from someone it considered to be a criminal. Justice
Burger himself unwittingly points this out in the part of his opinion
upholding the forfeiture when he states, "an acquittal on criminal
charges does not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely
proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt." 127 Those
words suggest that, because the government could not obtain a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, it is attempting a limited
retrial of the crime with lower stakes (that is, forfeiture of the guns, as
opposed to Mulcahey's freedom). Situations such as this strongly
implicate double jeopardy principles, even if they do not rise to the
level of true double jeopardy.
Disallowing subsequent or concurrent forfeiture actions in
conjunction with criminal proceedings would do much to increase the
fundamental fairness of the process. Civil trials brought by private
actors after a criminal acquittal have the purpose of attempting to
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S at 359 (quoting Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S.
291, 302 (1914)).
126. Id. at 359 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 633 (1938)).
127. Id. at 361.
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make allegedly wronged parties whole,2' but civil asset forfeiture
proceedings after a criminal acquittal only serve to give the
government two bites at the same apple of seized goods.
Increasing the standard of proof required in civil forfeiture
actions would similarly increase notions of fundamental fairness and
curb potential for abuses. U.S. Representative Henry Hyde originally
sought to increase the government's burden to the level of "clear and
convincing evidence" when he introduced the legislation in 1993,
which would later become CAFRA.'" Compromise talks eventually
set today's current standard at "preponderance of the evidence." 30
An increase in the burden of proof to "clear and convincing
evidence" would make it harder for the government to prevail at trial
where the evidence is weak or primarily circumstantial. The
government would still be successful where it has strong evidence that
seized items were proceeds of a crime or used in furtherance of a
crime, and would still face a lower burden than that used in a criminal
trial. As demonstrated by the text of the Fifth Amendment, the
framers of the Constitution did not intend for the government to be
able to take private property without meeting the requirements of
due process. The words "[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation""' would
be much better served by a "clear and convincing evidence" standard
for civil asset forfeitures.
Conclusion
The use of asset forfeiture as either a carrot or stick for the
enforcement of federal drug law shows promise, especially in times of
scarce law enforcement funding. Asset forfeiture allows state and
local agencies to increase their resources at the cost of criminals,
128. Pam Belluck, In New York, Many People Anticipated the Verdict, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 5, 1997), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9804E1DC163CF936A3
5751COA961958260. Such was the case with the highly publicized O.J. Simpson murder
trial. When Simpson was acquitted of killing Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald
Goldman, the families of the victims initiated a civil suit for wrongful death. The jury
found Simpson liable for the deaths and awarded the families $8.5 million in compensatory
damages.
129. Todd Barnet, Legal Fiction and Forfeiture: An Historical Analysis of the Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 77, 104 (2001).
130. Thomas M. Nickel, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, FED. LAWYER, Feb.
2001, at 24.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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while at the same time advancing federal drug policy goals. Residents
of cities and counties can determine the level of enforcement they
deem acceptable when state and federal laws clash (as with medical
cannabis) by using their votes to select law enforcement leaders who
are most closely aligned with their viewpoints. Recalcitrant state or
local governments can likely be prevented from profiting off of
violations of federal law if tax dollars stemming from illegal
transactions can be seized.
There are certainly drawbacks and conflicts of interest inherent
in the asset forfeiture process, but many of these can be mitigated by
reforming aspects of the forfeiture framework. A reduction in
opportunities for double jeopardy, in conjunction with an increase in
the burden of proof applicable to the government, would allow
forfeitures to better comport with principles of fundamental fairness.
With some effort and an organized large-scale program, the use of
asset forfeiture could revolutionize the enforcement of drug law,
while saving taxpayers an incredible amount of money. Why forfeit
that opportunity?
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